In 1988 Dybvig introduced the payo distribution pricing model (PDPM) as an alternative to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Under this new paradigm agents preferences depend on the probability distribution of the payo and for the same distribution agents prefer the payo that requires less investment. In this context he gave the notion of ecient payo. Both approaches run parallel to the theory of choice of von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947), known as the Expected Utility Theory and posterior axiomatic alternatives. In this paper we consider the notion of optimal payo as that maximizing the terminal position for a chosen preference functional and we investigate the relationship between both concepts, optimal and ecient payos, as well as the behavior of the ecient payos under dierent market dynamics. We also show that path-dependent options can be ecient in some simple models.
Introduction
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) can be seeing as an approach to investment analysis based on the following simple assumptions:
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Between two payos with equal variance an agent will choose the one with higher return.
In 1988 Dybvig introduced the payo distribution pricing model (PDPM) as an alternative to CAPM. His goal was to nd another alternative to evaluate investment performance. He assumed that agents preferences depend on the probability distribution of the payo and for the same distribution agents prefer the payo that requires less investment.
Both approaches run parallel to the axiomatic theory of choice of von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) and the posterior axiomatic alternatives; see for example Föllmer and Schied (2011) .
The von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) axiomatic theory together with the inclusion of risk aversion lead us to the expected utility theory (EUT).
The optimal payo consists in choosing a payo in such a way that we obtain the largest expected utility of the payo for a xed investment.
Alternatives to EUT are based on modications or elimination of the independence axiom. The independence axiom of the EUT says the following:
A preference relation on a set of probability distributions X satises the independence axiom if for all µ, ν ∈ X , µ ν implies αµ + (1 − α)τ αν + (1 − α)τ for all τ ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1].
Many examples or paradoxes show that this axiom or principle is not followed by real agents. The following example is a well known paradox where the independence axiom is violated.
Example 1 (Allais' paradox) You have to choose between:
and later between ν 1 = 0.33δ 2500 + 0.67δ 0 , ν 2 = 0.34δ 2400 + 0.66δ 0 .
Allais showed that for 66% of people µ 2 µ 1 and ν 1 ν 2 . However 1 2 (µ 2 + ν 1 ) = 1 2 (µ 1 + ν 2 ) and this violates the independence axiom. In fact if the independence is true and µ 2 µ 1 and ν 1 ν 2 we have
and taking α = 1/2 we obtain
The Dual Theory of Choice (DTC) (Yaari (1987) ) or the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (see KahnemanTverski (1979) and Tverski-Kahneman (1992)) are some of the alternatives to EUT. Both propose that the optimality of a payo is a functional of its law. For instance Yaari proposed a preference functional of the form
where h :
with h 1 , h 2 distortion functions and u 1 concave and u 2 convex, x 0 ∈ R is a reference level where consumers pass from being risk adverse to being risk takers. These functionals are particular cases of
The EUT is included in the previous framework with
In this work we investigate the relationship between the concepts of ecient and optimal payos. In addition we study the behavior of the ecient portfolio for various derivatives and dierent assets' price dynamics.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 contains preliminary results on expected utility theory and payo distribution pricing model. Section 3 studies ecient payos and law invariant preferences. Section 4 is devoted to ecient payos in a dynamic setting while Section 5 investigates conditional ecient payos.
EUT and PDPM
We start this section by recalling the denition of a utility function.
Denition 1 A utility function is map u : R → R ∪ {−∞}, which is strictly increasing and continuous on {u > −∞}, of class C 2 and strictly concave in the interior of {u > −∞}, and such that marginal utility tends to zero when wealth tends to innity, i.e.,
Let us denote the interior of {u > −∞} by dom(u). We will only consider the two following cases:
Case 2 dom(u) = R and u satises
The HARA utility functions u(x) = Let us x a pricing measure Q. Given w 0 > 0 and a utility function u, we want to nd a payo X, with initial value w 0 , that maximizes E(u(X)) that is we consider the following optimization problem
Such X if it exists is said to be an optimal payo. For the sake of simplicity we consider that interest rates are zero.
Proposition 1
The optimal payo is a decreasing function of dQ dP .
Proof. The corresponding Lagrangian for (1) is
Then, the obvious candidate to be the optimal terminal wealth is
where λ is the solution of the equation E Q (u )
The existence of X * follows from the fact that u is strictly concave, so (u ) −1 (·) is a strictly decreasing, and λ is positive and u takes values on R + (in both cases 1 and 2). To see the optimality of X * we can consider another payo X and we obtain that
whereX is in between X and X * . Since u is strictly concave, (a.s.) uniqueness follows.
Suppose that Y = (u )
is the payo of certain contract, then this payo is better than any other payo X with the same law as Y if the risk neutral measure used to price derivatives is Q and the utility function that we choose is u. Then a fortiori
In fact we have that
the optimality of Y . So among the payos with the same law as Y , Y is the payo with the lowest price. This is the idea of ecient payo introduced by Dybvig (1988a) and further developed in Dybvig (1988b) .
Recently a systematic study of ecient payos in dierent contexts has been done by Bernard et al. (2014) and Von Hammerstein et al. (2014) under the name of cost-ecient payos. Here we shall use the term ecient payo for brevity.
Denition 2 A payo Y is said to be an ecient payo if any other payo X with the same law is more expensive.
Therefore, we have proved, in the previous paragraph, the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The optimal payo w.r.t. the utility function u is an ecient payo. . Then we wonder if Z is an optimal payo w.r.t. another utility function. Let V be such utility function, that is, it must satisfy
Therefore it is sucient to have that
payo by the argument in the paragraph before Denition 2. As a consequence, if we want to create ecient payos with a xed distribution function F : R + →[0, 1) and we assume that dQ dP is a continuous random variable, then this ecient payo is given by
where it is assumed that F
, and F dQ dP (·) denotes the distribution function of dQ dP . This ecient payo is also an optimal payo w.r.t. a utility function V (·) (belonging to Case 1) which is a primitive function
The factor λ can obviously be omitted. We have derived the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume that dQ dP has a continuous distribution and that F is a smooth distribution function, such that F
is an ecient payo. X is also an optimal payo w.r.t. a utility function (belonging to Case 1 or Case 2)
Example 2 It is easy to see that when F and F log dQ dP are Gaussian the corresponding utility funcion is the exponential utility. In fact, if F log dQ dP
, where Φ (·) cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, then
and a primitive function, up to multiplicative constants, is given by
As we shall see later this smoothness condition on F can be relaxed. The relationship between ecient and optimal payos has also been studied in a recent paper by Bernard et al. Lemma 1 Let X ≥ 0 be a payo. Consider a model in which the risk neutral probability Q satises
Proof. First, set Z := E Q (X|S T ), by denition of the conditional expectation:
Theorem 1 If the risk neutral probability satises dQ dP ∈ σ(S T ), and the savings account is deterministic, path-dependent payos are dominated, in the sense that there is another payo with the same initial price and more terminal utility.
Proof. Given a payo X, deneX byX := E Q (X|S T ). Then, the price is the same, since the savings account (B t ) t≥0 is deterministic,
Now, by Lemma 1X
and given a utility function u
where the inequality follows from Jensen's inequality since u is concave.
However, as shown in Example 4, the condition dQ dP ∈ σ(S T ) is not satised in some simple models and the claim of Dybvig is not true in such cases. In the next section we consider a more general frame that includes EUT.
3 Ecient payos and law invariant preferences
EUT, DTC and CPT use monotone and law invariant functionals and this law invariance is in agreement with the Dybvig approach.
Here we follow Carlier-Dana (2011). Choose an agent with preference functional V (strictly monotone and law invariant) and initial wealth w 0 . Consider the optimization problem
where Q is the pricing measure and let the interest rate be zero. Further, assume that ψ := dQ dP has continuous distribution function F ψ .
Set
A := {x : (0, 1) → R + , x is increasing and right continuous} , and dene v(x) := V (x(U )) where U is a uniform distribution on (0, 1). Note that V (X) = v(F −1 X ). Consider now X of the form
Then the optimisation problem (3) is equivalent to sup v(x), x ∈ A, x bounded,
The condition (4) is not a restriction. In fact the solution to the optimal investment has to be in the set of ecient payos.
Theorem 2 Given two random variables X, Y we have
where U is a uniform distribution on (0, 1).
Proof. By the formula of Hoeding (see Lemma 2 in Lehman (1966))
So, the minimum of E (XY ), for xed F X and F Y , is obtained when F X,Y is minimum and this minimum is given by the Fréchet (1935) lower bound for F X,Y xed F X and F Y :
and this bound is reached if we take
This is the approach in Bernard et al. (2014a) to prove the result. Another way of proving it is by using the

Hardy-Littlewood inequalities directly (see for instance Theorem A.24 in Föllmer and Schied (2011)).
Note that if Y is continuous, we can choose U = F Y (Y ) and we can write the random variablē
Note that we have solved the problem
and its solution is given by X = F
. Hence we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The optimal payo w.r.t. a law invariant and monotone functional V (X) and initial wealth w 0 , is the ecient payo with distribution function F that satises
where I = x : (0, 1) → R + , x increasing, right continuous and bounded, It is interesting to notice that we have not assumed any additional condition on the preference functional except the monotonicity and the law invariance. Then we cannot in general guarantee the existence of the solution to the problem (3). In the case that
where u is a utility function. We also have the following theorem: This payo is the ecient payo that we dened in the previous section. We have seen that they have the form
Theorem 4 A payo X is ecient i it is a decreasing function of dQ dP .
Proof. If X is ecient then X = h dQ dP with h = F
that is decreasing, on the other hand if X = h dQ dP with h decreasing then
and
In the following examples, that can be found in Bernard et al. (2014a) , we illustrate the eciency or not of the payo of certain derivatives and the case they are not, we nd their corresponding ecient payo.
Example 3 Consider the Black-Scholes market model, dS t = S t (µdt + σdW t ) and
where C is a constant that depends on T. Then if we assume a bullish market: µ > r, dQ dP is a decreasing function of S T . So, any ecient payo has to be an increasing function of S T . In this context, the payos
are not ecient since they are decreasing functions of S T . Now
That is
As a consequence the corresponding ecient payos of a put option and a short forward are respectively,X
and the corresponding prices of the original and ecient payos are:
Short forward contract:
Ecient:
Note that ecient prices depend on µ, so their estimation can be dicult.
Example 4 Consider the path-dependent payo
It can be shown that, under a Black-Scholes model, the ecient payo is
This is in agreement with Theorem 1: path dependent options have inecient payos if
However if we a assume that the stock S evolves as
and the savings bank account as
with µ t , σ t , r t deterministic and càdlàg, then
Then, any payo that is a decreasing function of
will be ecient. Consider for instance a put option
in such a way that an optimal payo is
is a decreasing function of V T . In this situation a path dependent option is better than a vanilla option! contrarily to what the title of Dybvig (1988b) suggests, as explained in Section 2.1.
Ecient payos in a dynamic setting
Here we follow Becherer (2001) . Consider the set of strictly positive self-nancing portfolios with initial value one:
N ∈ N is said to be the numeraire portfolio (NP) if, for all V ∈ N , V /N is a supermartingale (w.r.t. the probability measure P). We say that an element of N is the growth-optimal portfolio (GOP) if it solves the maximization problem
We have the following important results.
Theorem 5 Assume u < ∞. Then the numeraire portfolio and the growth-optimal portfolio are the same.
Proof. See Proposition 4.3 in Becherer (2001) .
Theorem 6 If the market is complete the numeraire portfolio is given by
with F t := σ(S u , 0 ≤ u ≤ t).
Proof. See Example 1 in Becherer (2001).
In the Black-Scholes model
whereW is Q-Brownian motion. We have seen that any ecient payo can be written as a decreasing function of dQ dP and consequently as an increasing function of the nal value of the numeraire portfolio N T , sayX = h(N T ).
Then the (discounted) value of the replicating portfolio is given bỹ
from which (under smoothness assumptions on g), we get
Hence V is a locally optimal portfolio in the sense that it has the largest discounted drift given a diusion coecient (Platten (2002)) and
can be interpreted as a risk aversion coecient (Platten (2002) ).
If the market is incomplete, one uses the numeraire portfolio to get arbitrage free prices of a payo X by
The latter is referred as the benchmark approach where the numeraire is chosen in such a way that the corresponding risk-neutral measure coincides with the historical one (see Platen and Heath (2006) ). In this case a payo X is ecient i X is an increasing function of N T as above, but if we use a pricing measure Q a payo X will be ecient i it is a decreasing function of dQ dP . In the continuous case both approaches coincide if we use the minimal martingale measure (see Schweizer (1999) ).
If we consider an exponential Lévy model for S :
where Z is a Lévy process with characteristics (d, c 2 , ν) (with jumps strictly greater than −1) and the pricing measure Q is such that Z is a Q-Lévy process it can be seen (see Corcuera et al. (2006) ) that
with H(x) = The benchmark approach coincides with the pricing measure approach when
, and
since in this case the optimal terminal wealth corresponding to the log-utility can be replicated by using stocks and bonds (see Corcuera et al. (2006) , Example 4.1).
It will be also interesting to include optimal consumption problem in this context, as for example it is done in Fajardo (2003).
Conditional ecient payos
Reducing the importance of a payo to its law is quite controversial. For instance when one buys a Call option he/she is buying a right to buy a stock at a certain price and this is lost if he/she takes another payo with the same law but with dierent values. There are many other examples that suggest that, if there is no perfect correlation, the investor would like a xed dependency w.r.t. some special payo. 
Firstly, given Z, we can nd a function g(Z, Y ) such that (X, Y ) ∼ (g(Z, Y ), Y ). In fact, if we assume that Now we can solve the optimization problem (6). We know that E Q (X) = E dQ dP X , so, since the law of X and dQ dP are xed, if X ∼ h dQ dP for some decreasing function h, we reach the lower bound for E dQ dP X . But we have to x the conditional law, that is, we need that (X, Y ) ∼ h dQ dP , Y .
Then, according to the previous step, we can take h dQ dP = g dQ dP , Y .
In fact we are solving the conditional problem: in the set of random variables X such that X|Y = y is xed, we solve the problem An additional reason to consider conditional ecient payos could be the existence of privileged information about a certain payo Y . This might be object for future research.
